El caso Paulo Londra explicado

"Inmensa alegría", expresó el cantante ante la victoria en la primera instancia judicial que lo libera de la discográfica. La controversia legal por el plazo del acuerdo, y cómo se interpretó el contrato original sobre los derechos de autor

Paulo Londra es un cantante y compositor argentino, de Córdoba, muy popular. El más escuchado en Spotify en 2018 y 2019.

Desde 2020, está involucrado en una causa judicial por los derechos de su música. Londra co fundó un sello junto con Ovy On The Drums (Daniel Oviedo) y Kristo (Cristian Salazar). Con ellos tiene la disputa legal.

Firmó un contrato por el cual aceptaba que lo representen. La discusión legal se originó por la interpretación del plazo del acuerdo.

Durante los últimos dos años, Londra había alegado que Salazar y Oviedo lo “defraudaron” cuando lo hicieron firmar un memorando de acuerdo de empresa conjunta por tres años, informó Billboard.

La demanda de Paulo Londra

Londra presentó una demanda acusando a Salazar y Oviedo de fraude, alegó que fue “engañado” para firmar el acuerdo que lanzó Big Ligas pensando que era un “apoyo” para una filmación de video dirigida por Salazar.

El acuerdo había sido firmado al principio de su carrera, cuando tenía 19 años, por el cual le cedía sus derechos de publicación y composición a una empresa conjunta que cofundó.

El acuerdo estipulaba que Londra grabaría música exclusivamente para la empresa conjunta y asignaría a Big Ligas el 100% de sus grabaciones maestras y los derechos de autor de publicación a cambio de una regalía del 55% de las ganancias de Big Ligas  por las grabaciones y el 73,3% de las ganancias de Big Ligas (incluidos los anticipos) por composiciones musicales.

Londra alegó que el plazo del acuerdo fue luego prorrogado pero sin su consentimiento, es decir, Londra planteó que no debió seguir atado por ese acuerdo original.

De hecho, desde el sello discográfico presentaron una demanda contra el cantautor acusando a Londra de incumplimiento de contrato, porque dejó de entregar nueva música a pesar de sus obligaciones bajo el acuerdo.

El plazo del acuerdo de Londra según el contrato

Según Londra, ya habría terminado. Según la contraparte, todas las grabaciones de Londra serían de su propiedad hasta 2025. La cláusula dice esto:

El plazo se renovará automáticamente por períodos adicionales de un (1) año cada uno, a menos que cualquier parte  notifique a las otras dos por escrito su deseo de terminar el plazo en cualquier momento antes de la fecha (sic) en la que el plazo de vigencia expira…. Si durante el Plazo, [Big Ligas] celebrase un acuerdo de grabación exclusivo con un sello discográfico principal u otro sello discográfico de terceros (un “Acuerdo de grabación”), [Londra] no tendrá derecho a rescindir el Plazo como se describe en la oración anterior y el Plazo no expirará hasta la fecha seis (6) meses (sic) siguientes la expiración del “Plazo” de dicho Acuerdo de grabación. Sin prórroga, el término inicial del Acuerdo Memo expira el 20 de febrero de 2021.

Es decir, el plazo inicial del acuerdo es de tres años, pero si Big Ligas llegaba a un acuerdo de grabación o publicación con un “sello importante”, modificaría el plazo inicial de tres años del contrato.

Durante el transcurso del período, Big Ligas firmó un acuerdo de licencia de US$ 3 millones con Warner Music en enero de 2019 para el álbum Homerun de Londra.

Ahora, el juez William Thomas de Miami decidió que el plazo del contrato o acuerdo expiró el 20 de febrero de 2021, y agregó que “incluso si el lenguaje de los contratos relevantes respaldaba la interpretación ofrecida por Big Ligas del término del Memo del acuerdo (que claramente no lo hace), el Acuerdo no podría aplicarse porque constituiría una restricción ilegal del comercio y conduciría a resultados absurdos “.

Los fundamentos de la decisión en el caso Paulo Londra y cómo sigue la disputa legal

El acuerdo había sido redactado por Big Ligas y por lo tanto debería interpretarse a favor de Paulo Londra, entendió el juez.

Además, cualquier restricción a la libertad debe interpretarse en forma restrictiva, dijo el juez. Por ende, es Big Ligas quien debe probar que el acuerdo está en vigencia.

A esto se agrega que Paulo Londra tiene derecho a rescindir el acuerdo según su propio texto, y por ende, no puede seguir obligado.

La decisión sobre los derechos en el caso Londra

La decisión puede traducirse de la manera siguiente:

“Por lo tanto, este tribunal concluye que estas disposiciones exigen claramente que Big Ligas asegure
La aprobación de Londra antes de celebrar cualquier acuerdo, como la Enmienda Warner, relacionada con la
grabación, distribución o venta de Obras musicales de Londra.

Si los demandados de las Grandes Ligas pudieran, como proponen erróneamente, firmar unilateralmente un nuevo acuerdo de grabación o una enmienda, los derechos de aprobación expresa de Londra quedarían sin sentido. El acuerdo no puede ser interpretado en el sentido de que los derechos de aprobación de  Londra) no tengan vigencia o efecto.”

“Este acuerdo como cualquier otro contrato, no puede interpretarse en el sentido de otorgar un derecho de renovación perpetua sin un lenguaje claro y explícito para tal efecto”, concluyó el juez que libera a Londra de toda obligación. La sentencia aún puede ser apelada.

Sentencia en el caso Paulo Londra

fuente: Palabras Del Derecho

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO: 2020-006167-CA-44
(Consolidated with Case No. 20-005448)

BIG LIGAS, LLC, a Florida limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
v.
PAULO EZEQUIEL LONDRA, an
individual,
Defendant.
– and –
PAULO EZEQUIEL LONDRA an
individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
BIG LIGAS, LLC, a Florida limited
liability company, CRISTIAN ANDRES
SALAZAR, an individual, DANIEL
ECHAVARRIA OVIEDO p/k/a “OVY
ON THE DRUMS”, an individual,
RITHOLZ LEVY FIELDS, LLP, a
New York limited liability partnership,
MATTHEW GREENBERG, an individual,
STEPHANIE CHOPURIAN,
an individual,
Defendants.
________________________________________/

ORDER OF PAULO LONDRA’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiff, Paulo Londra (“Londra”), motion for
partial summary judgment on Count I (Declaratory Judgment) of his Second Amended Complaint.
The Court, having reviewed the Motion, heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise informed
of the premises, rules as follows:

Statement of Facts
In the operative Second Amended Complaint, Londra seeks declaratory relief relating to
the parties’ respective rights under the Deal Memo. Among other things, Londra seeks a
declaration that the Deal Memo’s term expires in February 2021 and that Londra is not bound by
the purported Warner Amendment requiring Londra write and record the Second Album (and
possibly additional albums) without his knowledge, consent or approval. (See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶
70(c)-(e)).

These are pure questions of law, ripe for summary judgment.
On or about February 21, 2018, Londra signed the Deal Memo. At the time that he signed
the Deal Memo, Londra was a 19 year old citizen of Argentina and allowed defendants Cristian
Salazar (“Salazar”) and Daniel Oviedo (“Oviedo”) to act as his personal managers. Defendants
Matthew Greenberg, Esq. (“Greenberg”), Stephanie Chopurian, Esq. (“Chopurian”), and Ritholz
Levy Fields LLP (“RLF”) (together, the “RLF Defendants”) drafted the Deal Memo. At the time,
Londra believed that the RLF Defendants were representing his interests. However, the RLF
Defendants take the position that they never represented Londra in his individual capacity. Londra
did not make any edits to the Deal Memo drafted by the RLF Defendants; in fact, the Deal Memo
does not contain a single negotiated term. The Deal Memo purports to transfer ownership of all of
Londra’s intellectual property (including his preexisting musical writings and recordings),
copyrights in music publishing, live concert performances, and name and likeness to Big Ligas.
The Deal Memo also purports to require Londra to exclusively provide his services as a songwriter
and recording artist to Big Ligas during the Deal Memo’s “Term.” The Deal Memo defines its
“Term” as follows: The “Term” of this Agreement shall initially extend for a period of three (3)
years from date of the full execution hereof.

Thereafter, the Term shall automatically renew for
additional periods of one (1) year each unless any Member shall notify the other two in writing of his desire to end the Term at any time prior to the dated (sic) on which the Term would otherwise
expire, except as provided in the remainder of this paragraph. If during the Term, [Big Ligas] shall
enter into an exclusive recording agreement with a Major Label or other third party record label (a
“Recording Agreement”), [Londra] shall not have the right to terminate the Term as described in
the preceding sentence and the Term shall not expire until the date six (6) moths (sic) following
the expiration of the “Term” of the such Recording Agreement. Absent extension, the initial term
of the Deal Memo expires on February 20, 2021. The Warner Agreement’s Recording Services
Term Expired on November 30, 2019. On or about January 2, 2019, Big Ligas entered into the
Warner Agreement.
The “Term” of the Warner Agreement is: (a) The term for [Londra’s] exclusive recording
services shall commence on the date hereof and shall continue for a period ending on the last day
of the sixth (6th) complete month following the date of the initial United States commercial release
of the Album constituting the Recording Commitment. As used herein, the term “Recording
Period’ or “Recording Services Term” shall mean the time period described in the foregoing
sentence, as such may be suspended or extended as provided herein. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, [Warner] shall have the exclusive right to manufacture, distribute, sell, and otherwise
exploit the Recordings (as defined below) licensed to Company hereunder subject to the terms and
conditions of this agreement commencing upon the date hereof until a period ending on the date
which is five (5) years following the date of the initial United States commercial release of the
Album constituting the Recording Commitment (the “License Period”) …. Unless the context
otherwise requires, the Recording Services Term and the License Period are sometimes
collectively referred to herein (sic) the “Term”. (See Warner Agreement, ¶ 2(a)) (emphasis in
original).

Warner commercially released Londra’s Album in the United States on May 23, 2019. This
release triggered the commencement of Londra’s six-month exclusive “Recording Commitment”
under the Warner Agreement. The Recording Commitment continued until November 30, 2019.
On February 14, 2020, Londra sent a notice to the Big Ligas Defendants exercising his contractual
right to end the term pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the Deal Memo. Two weeks after receiving
Londra’s termination notice, on March 2, 2020, Big Ligas purported to enter into an amendment
to the Warner Agreement requiring Londra to record at least the Second Album (“Warner
Amendment”). Londra never consented to, nor approved of, the Warner Amendment. Big Ligas’
thereafter characterize the new agreement as an amendment to the original Warner Agreement, as
a means to force Londra to record and deliver the Second Album. Specifically, Greenberg wrote
to Warner, emphasizing the need to present the Warner Amendment as a “modification” instead
of a new agreement. “As discussed today, it’s essential to Big Ligas that … Warner’s
counterproposal is not a proposal for a new agreement but rather is a proposal to modify the
existing agreement between Big Ligas and Warner respecting Paulo’s recording services”. Since
the Big Ligas Defendants unilaterally entered into the Warner Amendment without Londra’s
consent or approval, they have taken the position that the Deal Memo’s term does not expire until
2027. Londra disputes the Big Ligas Defendants’ contention that the term of the Deal Memo
extends until 2027. In the operative Second Amended Complaint, Londra seeks declaratory relief
relating to the parties’ respective rights under the Deal Memo. Among other things, Londra seeks
a declaration that the Deal Memo’s term expires in February 2021 and that Londra is not bound
by the purported Warner Amendment requiring Londra write and record the Second Album (and
possibly additional albums) without his knowledge, consent or approval. (See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶
70(c)-(e)).

Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to rule 1.150, summary judgment shall be granted if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150(1). Rule 1.150 was amended effective on May 1, 2021 “adopting the
text of federal rule 56 almost verbatim.” See In re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.150, SC20-1490, 2021 WL 1684095 at *3 (Fla. Apr. 29, 2021). As such, rule 1.150 “shall be
construed and applied in accordance with the federal summary judgment standard.” Fla. R. Civ. P.
150(a).
The initial burden is on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a “genuine, triable issue
of material fact.” See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The substantive law applicable to the dispute will identify which facts are material. See Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). As such, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Id. at 248. “Once the moving party has met its initial burden, Rule [1.150] requires the
nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for
trial.” Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000). In other words,
the nonmoving party must come forward with sufficient evidence supporting the existence of a
genuine triable issue of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-249; Celotex, 477 U.S. at
327. If a dispute about a material fact is genuine, meaning, if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party or the court could find in favor of the
nonmoving party, summary judgment is not proper. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. The Court’s
function at the summary judgment stage is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but it is limited to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249.

“[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a

jury to return a verdict for that party” or for the court to render a judgment in favor of the non-
movant. See id. When the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative and “the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no ‘genuine issue for trial’” and summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249-250;
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Inferences to
be drawn from the underlying facts and the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Legal Analysis
In the operative Second Amended Complaint, Londra seeks declaratory relief relating to
the parties’ respective rights under the Deal Memo. Among other things, Londra seeks a
declaration that the Deal Memo’s term expires in February 2021 and that Londra is not bound by
the purported Warner Amendment requiring Londra write and record the Second Album (and
possibly additional albums) without his knowledge, consent or approval. It is undisputed that these
are pure questions of law that the Court should resolve as a matter of law.
When interpreting a contract, summary judgment is warranted if a contract’s terms are clear
and unambiguous. See Dirico v. Redland Estates, Inc., 154 So. 3d 355, 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).
Ambiguity exists only when contractual language “is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” Washington Nat. Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943, 948 (Fla. 2013). “[A]
true ambiguity does not exist in a contract merely because the contract can possibly be interpreted
in more than one manner.” Dirico, 154 So. 3d at 357 (citing BKD Twenty–One Mgmt. Co. v.
Delsordo, 127 So. 3d 527, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). “When the terms of a contract are
unambiguous, courts give the contract language its plain and ordinary meaning.” Intrepid Ins. Co.

v. Prestige Imports, Inc., 78 So. 3d 583, 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Menendez, 70 So. 3d 566 (Fla. 2011)). In the instant case, Big Ligas’ counsel has
already conceded that the Deal Memo is clear and unambiguous.
In confirming the Deal Memo’s term, the relevant contractual language must be strictly
construed against the Big Ligas Defendants and liberally construed in favor of Londra under at
least four different rules of basic contract interpretation. First, the Deal Memo must be construed
against the Big Ligas Defendants because they drafted it. See Berloni S.p.A. v. Della Casa, LLC,
972 So. 2d 1007, 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“The language of an agreement is to be construed
most strongly against its drafter.”); Flagship Resort Development Corp. v. Interval Intern, Inc., 28
So. 3d 915, 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (construing language “most strongly against its drafter”).
Second, under Big Ligas’ interpretation of the Deal Memo, the Big Ligas Defendants would have
the ability to extend the Deal Memo any number of times, including in perpetuity, because every
unilateral entry into an extension/amendment of the Warner Agreement without Londra’s consent
would result in an extension of the term of the Deal Memo. The Deal Memo, like any other
contract, cannot be construed to grant a perpetual renewal right absent clear and explicit language
to that effect. See Miren Intern. Lodging Corp. v. Manley, 982 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA
2008) (contracts “in perpetuity are not favored and will not be so construed unless the intention to
give them that effect is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms”); Vanguard Recording Soc. v.
Kweskin, 276 F. Supp. 563, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (declining to enforce a recording contract on
equitable grounds because the record company’s interpretation of the term would turn a one-year
contract with two one-year renewal options into a contract that will run for more than five years).
Third, “Florida law makes clear that any agreement in restraint of trade is in derogation of common
law and must be strictly construed against the alleged restraint.” One Hour Air Conditioning

Franchising, LLC v. Dallas Unique Indoor Comfort, Ltd., No. 8:13–cv–3278, 2015 WL 9684920,
at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2015) (internal citations omitted). The Deal Memo must therefore be
construed against the Big Ligas Defendants to the extent that they are attempting to restrain Londra
from rendering his services as a recording artist, songwriter and entertainer to anyone other than
Big Ligas until 2027. Fourth, Londra’s right of termination in Paragraph 4 of the Deal Memo and
contractual right of approval over any agreement relating to the recording, distribution, licensing
or sale of Londra’s musical works would be rendered meaningless if the Deal Memo were
interpreted to authorize the Big Ligas Defendants to extend its term by unilaterally entering into
recording agreements without Londra’s consent. Londra’s express contractual rights cannot be
disregarded. See TRG Columbus Dev. Venture, Ltd. v. Sifontes, 163 So. 3d 548, 552 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015) (“a court may not interpret a contract so as to render a portion of its language meaningless
or useless”); Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority v. Electronic Transaction Consultants
Corp., 300 So. 3d 291, 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (same).
The Deal Memo unmistakably provides Londra with the right to terminate the Deal Memo
effective three years after the date of execution. (See Ex. 4, Deal Memo ¶ 4). Because the Deal
Memo was fully executed on February 21, 2018, its three-year term ends on February 20, 2021.

Additionally, there is no exclusive recording agreement that might extend the Deal Memo’s three-
year term. Londra’s exclusive “Recording Services Term” with Warner indisputably ended on

November 30, 2019 – i.e., the last day of the sixth (6th) complete month following the initial
United States commercial release of the Album. (See Greenberg Nov. 22, 2019 email, a true and
correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 13) (agreeing that the Warner Agreement’s Recording
Services Term expires “on or about today”). Big Ligas and Warner enter into the Warner
Agreement on January 2, 2019. On May 23, 2019 Warner releases Londra’s Album. On November

30, 2019 The Warner Agreement’s exclusive “Recording Services Term” expires the last day of
the sixth complete month following the release of the Album (See Ex. 5, Warner Agreement ¶
2(a)). Any potential extension of the Deal Memo’s term would end six months after the Warner
Agreement’s Recording Services Term on May 30, 2020. (See Ex. 4, Deal Memo ¶ 4). On February
20, 2021 The Deal Memo’s three-year term expires. Because Londra properly exercised his right
of termination under the Deal Memo on February 14, 2020, it is the finding of this Court that the
Deal Memo’s term ends no later than February 20, 2021.
The Big Ligas Defendants argue that the Deal Memo’s term does not expire until 2027. In
support of this argument the Big Ligas Defendants assert that: (1) for purposes of the Deal Memo’s
term, the Warner Agreement’s term spans the entire five-year License Period (not the six-month
Recording Services Term); and (2) Salazar and Oviedo, as managing members of Big Ligas, have
the authority to unilaterally enter into agreements for Londra’s recording services without
Londra’s consent or approval. This Court finds that the plain language of the relevant contracts
vitiates both assertions.
The Big Ligas Defendants’ first argument erroneously conflates the Warner Agreement’s
six-month exclusive Recording Services Term with the five-year License Period. These are two
very different concepts.1 The Warner Agreement’s License Period is not an “exclusive recording

1
During the Recording Services Term, Londra was required to provide his exclusive recording
services to Warner until “the last day of the sixth (6th) complete month following” the release of
the Album. (See Ex. 5, Warner Agreement, ¶ 2(a)). In contrast, the License Period grants to Warner
the exclusive right to exploit certain of Londra’s recordings in the marketplace for five years
following the release of the Album. (Id., ¶ 2(a)). Big Ligas has noticeably flip-flopped on this
point. Before this lawsuit was filed, the Big Ligas Defendants conceded that Londra could
terminate the Deal Memo on February 20, 2021. (See Ex. 13, in which Greenberg agrees that the
Warner Agreement’s Recording Services Term expires “on or about today” [Nov. 22, 2019] and
arguing that the “term” of the Deal Memo “endures for a minimum or three years from execution,
i.e., until February 20, 2021”) (emphasis in original); Ex. 12, Greenberg Dec. 5, 2019 Letter (“The
Term of the Deal Memo Cannot Expire Earlier than February 20, 2021”) (emphasis added)).

agreement.” The only exclusive recording agreement term to which Londra has consented is the
Warner Agreement’s six-month Recording Services Term for the Album.
The Deal Memo also does not (and cannot) give the Big Ligas Defendants the right to
control the personal services of Londra in perpetuity without his consent. While the Deal Memo
provides Salazar and Oviedo with the authority to “sign agreements” on behalf of Big Ligas , the
Deal Memo expressly requires the Big Ligas Defendants obtain Londra’s consent before entering
into any excluding recording services agreements. Specifically, the Deal Memo provides that Big
Ligas may only “distribute, license, sell or otherwise exploit Goods subject to your and our mutual
approval” (Id., ¶ 3(b)) (emphasis added). “Goods” is defined as “items and materials embodying
Works in any and all physical and non-physical media and formats now or hereafter known.” (Id.,
¶ 14(d)). “Works,” in turn, is defined to include “all results and proceeds of Artist’s Services during
the Term, including but not limited to musical compositions, recordings, ….” (Id., ¶ 14(p)).
Further, the creation of Londra’s Works as well as the marketing and exploitation of Goods
embodying these Works are to be governed by a series of written budgets, timelines and other
specifications that Londra, Oviedo and Salazar “will, from time to time, develop together” and “as
may be revised from time to time subject to our mutual approval” (the “Joint Venture Business
Plans”). (Id., ¶ 14(f)). Oviedo and Salazar are “responsible for committing Joint Venture Business
Plans to written form which will be subject to [Londra’s] review and approval.” (Id., ¶ 3(a)).
Moreover, the Deal Memo anticipates that Londra’s compliance with any request for approval by
Oviedo and Salazar would be preceded by their “reasonable prior notice and consultation.” (Id., ¶

Notably, when Big Ligas’ counsel sent these communications, Warner had already released the
Album, yet the Big Ligas Defendants did not claim that the Deal Memo’s term was tied to the
Warner Agreement’s five-year License Period. It was not until after Londra terminated the Deal
Memo that the Big Ligas Defendants shifted to their convenient-but-baseless argument that the
Deal Memo’s term extends throughout the Warner Agreement’s five-year License Period.

8). Therefore, this Court concludes that these provisions plainly require Big Ligas to secure
Londra’s approval before entering into any deal, such as the Warner Amendment, relating to the
recording, distribution or sale of Londra’s musical Works. If the Big Ligas Defendants could, as
they erroneously propose, unilaterally sign an amended (or more accurately, new) recording
agreement, Londra’s express approval rights would be rendered meaningless. The Deal Memo
cannot, as a matter of law, be interpreted to render Londra’s approval rights to be of no force or
effect. See TRG Columbus Dev., 162 So. 2d at 552.
For all of the reasons discussed above, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff, PAULO EZEQUIEL
LONDRA’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. This Court concludes that pursuant
to the unambiguous contracts, the Deal Memo’s term expired on February 20, 2021. Even if the
language of the relevant contracts supported Big Ligas’ proffered interpretation of the Deal
Memo’s term (which it plainly does not), the Deal Memo could not be enforced because it would
constitute an illegal restraint of trade and lead to absurd results.2
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida, on 08/23/21.

Los comentarios están cerrados, pero trackbacks Y pingbacks están abiertos.